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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 12897

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: RED STAR ON CRUISE MISSILES

1. SUMMARY. THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF DEFENSE NEWSPAPER ON SEPTEMBER 10 STATES IN A SIGNED COMMENTARY THAT CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT IS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN THE U.S. IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO CIRCUMVENT THE SALT-I AGREEMENT. BY STRESSING THE "EXTREME DIFFICULTY" INVOLVED IN VERIFYING DEPLOYMENT, TESTING, AND PRODUCTION LIMITATIONS ON SUCH MISSILES, THE ARTICLE CLEARLY SUGGESTS THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH MISSILES WOULD PRESENT A NEARLY INSOLUBLE PROBLEM FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON FUTURE ARMS AGREEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. THE ARTICLE ("STILL ANOTHER MISSILE" BY N. SHASKOL'SKIY, IDENTIFIED AS A RESERVE NAVAL COMMANDER) OUTLINES THE HISTORY OF THE CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND CLAIMS TO QUOTE FROM ORIGINAL CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY IN 1972 THAT THE PROGRAM WAS UNDERTAKEN TO ENSURE "THE DEFENSE OF NATIONAL SECURITY UNDER CONDITIONS DETERMINED BY LIMITATIONS RESULTING FROM THE AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS." IT DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CRUISE MISSILES, NOTING THAT THEY WILL HAVE GUIDANCE SYSTEMS WITH A CEP OF 160 METERS, AND DWELLS IN PARTICULAR ON THEIR LAUNCH CAPABILITY FROM SUBMARINE TORPEDO TUBES. IN THIS DESCRIPTION CLEAR REFERENCE IS MADE TO SALT-I LIMITATIONS, FOLLOWED BY EXPLANATIONS OF HOW A CRUISE MISSILE CAN BE USED TO CIRCUMVENT THESE LIMITATIONS. ("THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL POTENTIALLY BE POSSIBLE FOR THE PENTAGON TO ARM WITH STRATEGIC MISSILES NOT ONLY 41 MISSILE SUBMARINES BUT ALSO MORE THAN 50 OTHER NUCLEAR ATTACK ("TORPEDO") SUBMARINES.")

3. THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT, "ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS," "A VERY IMPORTANT 'BASIS' FOR THE NEED TO DEVELOP A NEW

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AMERICAN MISSILE NOW IS THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES ARE NOT COVERED BY THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT, WHICH LIMITS ONLY BALLISTIC MISSILES. AN ADDITIONAL STIMULUS FOR THE PENTAGON IS THE FACT THAT VERIFICATION AND (ESTABLISHMENT OF) LIMITS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH WEAPONS PRESENTS EXTREME DIFFICULTY."

4. EXPLAINING THE VERIFICATION AND PRODUCTION CONTROL DIFFICULTIES IT ENVISAGES, THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT (1) STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES WILL BE INDISTINGUISHABLE BY EXTERIOR CHARACTERISTICS FROM TACTICAL CRUISE MISSILES ALSO UNDER DEVELOPMENT; (2) BY VIRTUE OF THEIR LOW FLYING ALTITUDES, CRUISE MISSILES CAN UNDERGO TESTS WHICH ARE "ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE" TO FOLLOW; AND (3) NOT ONLY STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUBS BUT ALSO "ANY ATTACK ("TORPEDO") SUBMARINE", FOR WHICH NO PROVISION FOR LIMITATION HAS BEEN MADE, CAN BECOME A LAUNCHING PLATFORM.

5. THE ARTICLE STATES THAT LEADERS OF THE U.S. DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT ARE SAYING THAT THE MISSILE WILL PRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL ADDITION TO U.S. "STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS," AND CONCLUDES THAT "THESE PLANS OF THE PENTAGON CAN BE REGARDED AS NOTHING OTHER THAN A DESIRE FURTHER TO WHIP UP THE ARMS RACE AND SLOW POSITIVE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION."

6. COMMENT: THE ARTICLE IS FOOTNOTED AS BEING DERIVED FROM "MATERIALS IN THE FOREIGN PRESS," AND SEEMS TO FOLLOW A FAIRLY STANDARD FORMAT FOR ARTICLES ON DEVELOPMENTS IN FOREIGN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS. THE LANGUAGE IT USES IS LITTLE IF ANY HARSHER THAN THAT USUALLY FOUND IN RED STAR COMMENTARIES. IT NEVERTHELESS SUGGESTS THAT IF CRUISE MISSILES ARE DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED, CONSTRUCTING AN ARMS AGREEMENT WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF SUCH MISSILES WOULD BE "EXTREMELY" DIFFICULT. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE ARTICLE HAS BEEN PUBLISHED AS A PUBLIC EXPLANATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE FACE OF RECENT WESTERN PRESS CRITICISM. STOESSEL